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TORTS - RES IPSA LOQUITUR IS INAPPLICABLE WHEN
A PLAINTIFF OFFERS EXPERT TESTIMONY TO
FURNISH A COMPLETE EXPLANATION OF THE
SPECIFIC CAUSE OF AN ACCIDENT. Dover Elevator Co.
v. Swann, 334 Md. 231, 638 A.2d 762 (1994).
I. INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was born on the back of a
flour barrel in nineteenth century England. It was in the case of
Byrne v. BoadleI that Chancellor Pollock argued that a flour barrel
which had fallen out of a second story window and injured his client
was an occurrence explainable by res ipsa loquitur, or "the thing
speaks for itself. ' 2 From this seemingly "ordinary" incident, a
myriad of legal debate and uncertainty has arisen.3 The Court of
Appeals of Maryland, in Dover Elevator Co. v. Swann,4 clarified
the impact of direct evidence and expert testimony on the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur.
The facts of Dover Elevator present a typical res ipsa loquitur
scenario: Like a barrel falling from a window, the misleveling of an
elevator invokes an inference of negligence.' Nevertheless, the Court
of Appeals of Maryland reversed the court of special appeals's
determination that a jury instruction on res ipsa loquitur was appro-
1. 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (P.C. 1863).
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D cmt. a (1965). Chancellor Pollock's
reference to the Latin phrase, res ipsa loquitur, carried the connotation that
such an event would not have occurred but for negligence. Id. § 328D cmt. b.
Chancellor Pollack is credited with coining the phrase that would soon develop
into an evidentiary principle that would permit an inference of negligence from
circumstantial evidence. Id.; see infra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
3. As Chief Judge Orth noted: "Ever since 1863 ... the thing has been attempting
to speak for itself .... The attempts have been loud but not clear." Chesapeake
and Pac. Tel. Co. v. Hicks, 25 Md. App. 503, 509, 337 A.2d 744, 748-49
(1975) (citations omitted).
4. 334 Md. 231, 638 A.2d 762 (1994). In Dover Elevator, the plaintiff was injured
when the elevator he was boarding failed to become level with the floor. Id.
at 234, 638 A.2d at 764. See infra notes 119-21 and accompanying text for
further discussion.
5. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D cmt. a.
Baltimore Law Review
priate in this case. 6 The court of appeals held that the plaintiff could
not rely on res ipsa loquitur because he sought to explain the precise
cause of the accident with expert testimony. 7 The opinion is an
important declaration of Maryland law on the relationship between
direct evidence and res ipsa loquitur. As a result of Dover Elevator,
a plaintiff may not present specific or comprehensive direct evidence
and still rely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.8 More importantly,
the holding represents Maryland's departure from the majority of
jurisdictions, which have adopted less restrictive principles in this
area. 9
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
A. The Origin of Res Ipsa Loquitur
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur arose before the advent of the
modern discovery system.' 0 At that time, wrongly injured plaintiffs
had no way to recover if the evidence establishing the injury was
solely in the hands of the defendant." In order to avoid this inequity,
the courts adopted res ipsa loquitur. 2 The doctrine gives a plaintiff
the opportunity to establish a prima facie case of negligence with
circumstantial evidence when specific evidence is otherwise inacces-
sible."
Although the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has been complex in
its application, the basic criteria are straightforward. As a general
rule, a plaintiff must prove three elements in order to invoke the
doctrine: (1) the event must be one that ordinarily does not occur in
the absence of someone's negligence; (2) the event must have been
6. Dover Elevator, 334 Md. at 234, 638 A.2d at 764. The court of special appeals
held that the trial judge erred in refusing to submit a res ipsa loquitur instruction
to the jury. Swann v. Prudential Ins. Co., 95 Md. App. 365, 413, 620 A.2d
989, 1012 (1993), rev'd sub nom. Dover Elevator Co. v. Swann, 334 Md. 231,
638 A.2d 762 (1994).
7. See Dover Elevator, 334 Md. at 253, 638 A.2d at 773.
8. See infra notes 144-52 and accompanying text for further discussion of the
court of appeals's rationale in Dover Elevator.
9. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D cmt. m (1965).
10. Ronald J. Allen, Burdens of Proof, Uncertainty, and Ambiguity in Modern
Legal Discourse, 17 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 627-32 (1994). "The rule persists
in these post-discovery days because of its added incentive to the full production
of information, which is at the heart of modern litigation theory." Id. at 628.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Pahanish v. Western Trails, Inc., 69 Md. App. 342, 359, 517 A.2d 1122, 1130-
31 (1986) (citing Stevens v. Union Memorial Hosp., 47 Md. App. 627, 630,
424 A.2d 1118 (1981)).
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caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control
of the defendant; and (3) the event must not have occurred due to
a voluntary or contemplated act of the plaintiff. 14 Although some
jurisdictions use variants of the general rule, these variations are
based in whole or in part on these three generally recognized criteria. 5
All jurisdictions agree that the mere happening of an accident does
not justify recourse to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
16
Res ipsa loquitur is neither an independent tort doctrine nor a
cause of action. Rather, res ipsa loquitur is an evidentiary principle, 7
and, more specifically, it is a rule of circumstantial evidence.' 8 In
the majority of jurisdictions, the plaintiff may prove circumstances
surrounding an occurrence causing his injury, and the jury may infer
both negligence and causation from that occurrence. 19 The jury is
not compelled to accept the inference of negligence, and the defendant
has no duty to present evidence to rebut it.20 Thus, the burden of
production does not shift.
On the other hand, a small minority of jurisdictions hold that
the burden of production shifts to the defendant at the completion
of the plaintiff's case. 2' In those jurisdictions, the defendant is
14. WILLIM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TPRTS § 39 (5th ed. 1984)
(citing 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2509 (1st ed. 1905)).
15. Id. For example, some courts suggest a fourth criterion that requires the
plaintiff to demonstrate that the defendant either has knowledge of the cause
of the accident or is in a better position than the plaintiff to obtain knowledge
of the occurrence. Id. Other courts require the plaintiff to meet only the first
two criteria. See, e.g., Gayheart v. Dayton Power & Light Co., 648 N.E.2d
72, 78 (Ohio App. 1994). Finally, some courts add language to the first
criterion that requires a layman to deduce or an expert to provide that the
event would not occur but for the negligence of the defendant. See, e.g.,
Lecander v. Billmeyer, 492 N.W.2d 167, 170 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992).
16. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D cmt. c (1965); PROSSER, supra
note 14, § 39, at 246.
17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D cmt. a (1965). Although res ipsa
loquitur began as merely a rule of evidence, it has been confused as various
jurisdictions apply differing procedural effects. See id.
18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D cmt. b (1965); PROSSER, supra note
14, § 39, at 243. In fact, "[tihe great majority of American courts [still] regard
res ipsa loquitur as no more than one form of circumstantial evidence." Id. §
40, at 257 (citations omitted).
19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D cmt. b (1965). Controversy continually
surrounds the procedural effects of the doctrine because courts have complicated
this simple evidentiary principle with established tort maxims that switched the
burden of proof from the plaintiff to the defendant. Id. Maryland case law
holds that the plaintiff's burden of proof does not shift to the defendant.
Pahanish, 69 Md. App. at 360, 517 A.2d at 1131.
20. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D cmt. n (1965).
21. PROSSER, supra note 14, § 40, at 258. Louisiana and perhaps Colorado and
Mississippi have gone even further and have held that the ultimate burden of
proof shifts to the defendant, "requiring [him] to introduce evidence of greater
weight than that of the plaintiff." Id. at 258-59.
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required to overcome a rebuttable presumption that his acts consti-
tuted negligence. 2 If the defendant fails to produce exonerating
evidence, a verdict is directed for the plaintiff.
2a
Although both the majority and minority criteria for invoking
the doctrine appear straightforward, its application is often compli-
cated and confusing. 24 The problems concern evidentiary presentation.
Because res ipsa loquitur is a rule premised on circumstantial evi-
dence, problems arise as to the amount and type of evidence which
may be demonstrated by the plaintiff. 25 Courts are split on two
issues: (1) Whether a plaintiff may point to specific acts of negligence
and rely on res ipsa loquitur;26 and (2) whether the plaintiff may
introduce expert testimony and still invoke the doctrine.
27
B. Specific Evidence of Negligence and Res Ipsa Loquitur
Because res ipsa loquitur is premised on the existence and use
of circumstantial evidence, an obvious problem arises when a plaintiff
presents specific evidence of negligence. Courts generally examine the
amount of evidence presented and determine on a case-by-case basis
whether the doctrine may be invoked. 28 "Three categories are gen-
erally considered when determining the applicability of res ipsa
loquitur when specific evidence is offered: (1) A plaintiff can offer
little or no evidence of negligence; (2) a plaintiff can offer some
evidence of negligence; or (3) a plaintiff can offer substantial evidence
of negligence."
29
Under most circumstances, a plaintiff may rely upon res ipsa
loquitur when either little or no evidence of negligence is presented
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Gayheart v. Dayton Power & Light Co., 648 N.E.2d 72, 78 (Ohio App. 1994)
(noting that "the mere statement of the rule is usually much easier than its
actual application") (citing Soltz v. Colony Recreation Ctr., 87 N.E.2d 167
(Ohio 1949)); see also PROSSER, supra note 14, § 39, at 243-44; RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D cmt. a (1965).
25. PROSSER, supra note 14, § 40, at 260. The reason for the confusion is the
intermingling of two principles: "one concerned with the sufficiency of circum-
stantial evidence, the other with the burden of proof . . . ." Id. § 39, at 243.
"From this fusion there emerged a tentative 'doctrine' which has been the
source of some considerable trouble to the courts." Id. at 243-44. See generally
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D cmt. a (1965).
26. See infra notes 28-43 and accompanying text for a discussion of the treatment
of specific evidence.
27. See infra notes 44-95 and accompanying text for a discussion of the effect of
expert testimony on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
28. E.g., Gayheart, 648 N.E.2d at 78 (citing Jennings Buick, Inc. v. Cincinnati,
406 N.E.2d 1385 (Ohio 1980)); see, e.g., Perkins v. Hausladen, 828 S.W.2d
652, 656 (Ky. 1992) (concluding that, based on the facts of this particular case,
evidence was sufficient to present res ipsa loquitur instruction to the jury); cf.
Alan H. Konig, Note, Tort Law - Res Ipsa Loquitur in Medical Malpractice
Actions: Mireles v. Broderick, 23 N.M. L. REv. 411, 415 (1993).
29. Konig, supra note 28, at 415.
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or when some evidence of negligence is presented,30 provided that,
at a minimum, there is enough evidence to "remove the causation
question from the realm of conjecture and place it within the realm
of permissible inferences."'" However, when a plaintiff attempts to
furnish a complete explanation of the cause of an accident by
presenting substantial evidence of negligence, courts are not likely to
allow access to the doctrine.1
2
The reasoning behind the prevailing view, that presentation of
substantial evidence erodes the usefulness of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur, can be found in the meaning of the Latin phrase itself.
Because res ipsa loquitur literally means "the thing speaks for itself,"
courts are willing to let the act or occurrence speak for the plaintiff.
30. Id. at 415.
Generally, when a plaintiff offers little or no evidence of negligence,
the doctrine is still applicable. When a plaintiff offers some evidence
of negligence, a court may still allow the application of res ipsa
loquitur. When a plaintiff offers substantial evidence of negligence,
courts generally tend to prohibit the use of the doctrine.
Id. (citations omitted).
31. Lecander v. Billmeyer, 492 N.W.2d 167, 170 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992) (quoting
Turtenwald v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 201 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Wis. 1972)).
32. E.g., Sanderson v. Chapman, 487 F.2d 264, 267 (9th Cir. 1973) (holding that
if plaintiff introduces specific evidence of negligence, he cannot invoke doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur); Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. La Roche, 325 S.E.2d
908, 910 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985) (finding doctrine inapplicable where cause of
accident is fully explained but applicable only in cases where there is no
evidence of consequence); McCann v. Baton Rouge Gen. Hosp., 276 So. 2d
259, 261 (La. 1973) (finding doctrine irrelevant when body of specific evidence
as to cause of accident exists); Armstrong v. Johnson Motor Lines, Inc., 12
Md. App. 492, 497, 280 A.2d 24, 27 (1971) (holding res ipsa loquitur inappli-
cable where everything relative to case is known); Massengill v. Starling, 360
S.E.2d 512, 514-15 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987) (finding testimony at trial so complete
as to leave no room for inference); Perry v. H & S Mechanical Constr., 578
S.W.2d 423, 427 (Tex. Ct. App. 1979) (holding that where defendant's acts
and omissions are conclusively established and undisputed at trial, res ipsa
loquitur does not apply); Dodge, Inc. v. Drott Tractor Co., 198 N.W.2d 621,
623 (Wis. 1972) (holding that doctrine cannot be applied where cause of
accident has been clearly established). Contra Bedford v. Re, 510 P.2d 724,
727 (Cal. 1973) (introducing specific acts of negligence does not deprive plaintiff
of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine); Ciciarelli v. Ames Dep't Stores, Inc., 557
N.Y.S.2d 787, 788 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (pleading specific acts of negligence
does not defeat the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur); Seneca Ins. Co. v. Vogt
Auto Serv., 573 N.E.2d 223, 224 (Ohio Municip. 1991) (holding that plaintiff
does not lose the right to rely on doctrine by pleading or proving specific acts
of negligence); Jones v. Tarrant Util. Co., 638 S.W.2d 862, 865 (Tex. 1982)
(finding doctrine applicable if specific negligence is shown).
For a thorough discussion of the impact of specific evidence on the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur, as well as a description of applicable cases, see 1 STUART




The doctrine was created on the premise that the plaintiff either
lacked evidence33 or was denied evidence by the defendant.34 Thus,
allowing the plaintiff merely to point to an occurrence and rely upon
the circumstances surrounding the incident is justified by the doctrine,
while providing a complete explanation of the occurrence is not.35
This reasoning was adopted by the Court of Appeals of Ohio
in Gayheart v. Dayton Power & Light Co.36 In Gayheart, the plaintiff
brought an action against a power company and alleged that he was
injured when the defendant negligently caused an electrical fire.3 The
plaintiff relied on res ipsa loquitur and presented testimony at trial
that supported three possible causes of the fire.3" Although the
defendant argued that the plaintiff's evidence was insufficient to
invoke the doctrine,3 9 the court of appeals disagreed. The court noted
that the fact that the plaintiff could not specify which of the three
causes was the true cause of the accident did not preclude the res
ipsa loquitur instruction 0 "Rather, it [made] this case a particularly
appropriate one for the application of the . . . doctrine. ' 41 The court
concluded that had the plaintiff pointed to the exact cause of the
accident there would have been no need to apply the doctrine.4 2
As the Gayheart opinion illustrates, it is often the facts of each
particular case that will dictate whether the plaintiff may rely on the
doctrine. If a court determines that the amount of specific evidence
presented is sufficient to destroy the inference upon which the doc-
33. See PROSSER, supra note 14, § 39, at 212-13.
34. Id. at 225. Today, however, the fact that evidence is in the hands of the
defendant is but one factor to consider. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
328D cmt. k (1965). The premise that the plaintiff is in no position to obtain
evidence is central to the purpose for which the doctrine was created. See
PROSSER, supra note 14, § 39, at 217-18.
35. See supra note 32 for a comparison of cases addressing the issue of the impact
of specific evidence on the doctrine.
36. 648 N.E.2d 72 (Ohio App. 1994).
37. Id. at 75.
38. Id. The plaintiff's expert, Dr. Mericle, originally testified that any of five
causes could have led to the accident. Id. Dr. Mericle, however, ruled out two
of the five causes - lightning and accidents - and concluded that one of the
three remaining causes was responsible for the fire. Id. In addition, Dr. Mericle
.testified that the other three causes were under the complete control of the
defendants. Id.
39. Id. at 77. The defendants presented testimony from three experts. Id. at 75-
76. The experts disagreed as to the cause of the fire. Id. The defense hoped
to show that because the cause could not be pinpointed, the plaintiff's case
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trine is based, a res ipsa loquitur instruction will not be given to the
jury.
4 3
C. The Impact of Expert Testimony on the Doctrine of Res Ipsa
Loquitur
Problems also arise when expert testimony is presented in a case
in which the plaintiff relies on res ipsa loquitur. Expert testimony is
often used to demonstrate the cause of an accident." Experts point
to specific occurrences and render opinions based on the evidence as
to how or why an accident took place. Expert testimony, by defini-
tion, is often substantial evidence in itself and, thus, may preclude




Medical malpractice cases are the most obvious examples of
cases involving expert testimony. 46 In most jurisdictions, expert tes-
timony is not only needed to demonstrate negligence, it is often
required.47 Medical malpractice cases are also particularly appropriate
for res ipsa loquitur.48 Such cases are "of the type which come[]
within the reason and spirit of the doctrine more fully perhaps than
any other."
49
Patients who are negligently injured during surgery are often
unconscious and, thus, are unable to point to the specific cause of
the injury.50 In addition, unconscious plaintiffs are in no position to
43. See supra notes 28-43 and accompanying text for a discussion of the various
approaches courts have taken in addressing the impact of specific evidence on
the doctrine.
44. Typically, expert testimony is necessary in medical malpractice cases. E.g.,
Fulton v. Pfizer Hosp. Prods. Group, 872 S.W.2d 908, 912 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1993) (holding that because laymen cannot understand the complex nature of
medical malpractice cases, expert testimony is required). Cases involving com-
plex matters, machinery or theories also require expert testimony. See, e.g.,
Gayheart v. Dayton Power & Light Co., 648 N.E.2d 72, 75-76 (Ohio Ct. App.
1994) (finding expert testimony necessary to explain probable cause of fire);
DaVinci Creations, Inc. v. Nu-Frame Co., 418 A.2d 851 (R.I. 1980) (holding
testimony and photographs taken by expert demonstrated probable cause of
accident); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D cmt. d (1965).
Where there is "no fund of common knowledge," expert testimony may be
necessary. Id.
45. See, e.g., Lecander v. Billmeyer, 492 N.W.2d 167, 171 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992)
(where expert testimony points to exact cause of injury, plaintiff may not rely
on res ipsa loquitur).
46. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
.47. See supra note 44.





have control over the instrumentality that causes the injury, while
the doctor has complete control."' Thus, res ipsa loquitur has been
invoked in a case where a physician left a surgical implement within
a patient's body cavity. 2 In such a case, it is clear, even to laymen,
that a surgical implement would not be left in a patient's body in
the absence of negligence. In less overt cases, however, a plaintiff
may need to introduce expert testimony to demonstrate that the
injury complained of resulted from the substandard care of the
attending physician."
There are two opposing theories concerning the use of expert
testimony in medical malpractice cases in which the plaintiff relies
on res ipsa loquitur: "(1) The use of such testimony is fatal to the
doctrine; or (2) The use of such testimony is permissible and, in
some cases, crucial to the doctrine. '5 4
Jurisdictions that subscribe to the view that expert testimony is
fatal to res ipsa loquitur in medical malpractice cases reason that the
doctrine requires that a layperson be able to rely on common knowl-
edge and experience in determining whether the occurrence could not
have happened in the absence of negligence.5 5 Thus, when an expert
51. See id.
52. See Haddock v. Arnspiger, 793 S.W.2d 948, 951 (Tex. 1990) (citations omitted).
Other typical examples where the nature of the injuries are within the common
knowledge of laymen include negligence in the operation of a surgical instru-
ment and operating on the wrong portion of the body. Id. (citations omitted);
see also RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 328D cmt. d (1965). It can be
fairly said that types of medical malpractice in which, for example, a sponge
is left in the patient's body, are events that do not normally occur in the
absence of negligence. Id.
53. See supra note 44.
54. Konig, supra note 28, at 413.
55. E.g., LePelley v. Grefenson, 614 P.2d 962, 966 (Idaho 1980) (holding res ipsa
loquitur applicable only in those cases where layperson can rely on common
knowledge and observation), superseded by statute as stated in Sherwook v.
Carter, 805 P.2d 452, 460 (Idaho 1991); see Haddock v. Arnspiger, 793 S.W.2d
948, 951 (Tex. 1990) (finding that res ipsa loquitur is rarely applied in medical
malpractice actions unless the nature of alleged malpractice is within common
knowledge of laymen); see also Ward v. United States, 838 F.2d 182, 188 (6th
Cir. 1988) (addressing Tennessee law); Lemke v. United States, 557 F. Supp.
1205, 1210 (D.N.D. 1983) (interpreting North Dakota Law); Monk v. Vesely,
525 So. 2d 1364, 1365-66 (Ala. 1988); McWain v. Tucson Gen. Hosp., 670
P.2d 1180, 1183 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983); Lacy v. G.D. Searle & Co., 484 A.2d
527, 530 (Del. Super. Ct. 1984); Savina v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 795 P.2d 915,
934 (Kan. 1990); Harris v. Penninger, 613 S.W.2d 211, 214-15 (Mo. Ct. App.
1981).
There is some confusion as to whether common knowledge is a hurdle which
must be passed in order to invoke the doctrine or whether common knowledge
is simply a rationale upon which courts base the decision not to allow recourse
to res ipsa loquitur in medical malpractice actions. See Konig, supra note 28,
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is necessary to furnish an explanation for the occurrence, the evidence
has left the realm of common understanding and the "act" may no
longer be said to "speak for itself."
'5 6
Other jurisdictions proscribe reliance on the doctrine when expert
testimony is presented because the testimony purports to furnish a
complete explanation for the occurrence.57 This rationale is essentially
an extension of the argument that presenting specific acts of negli-
gence precludes reliance on the doctrine.58 Because experts often
testify that a specific surgical procedure was negligently utilized or
omitted, courts will treat such specific testimony as direct evidence
- evidence which destroys the inferences upon which res ipsa loquitur
must be based.5 9
"The prevalent view, however, appears to be that expert testi-
mony may be used in support of res ipsa loquitur in medical
malpractice actions. "60 Whether the doctrine may be invoked depends
on the nature and extent of the plaintiff's expert testimony. 6' For
example, if the expert testimony merely furnishes a description of a
surgical procedure or only provides information necessary to under-
stand the alleged injury, the court will likely give a res ipsa loquitur
instruction. 62 On the other hand, if the testimony furnishes a complete
explanation of the accident, the court will hold the doctrine inappli-
at 413. Most jurisdictions that adhere to some form of common knowledge
requirement in medical malpractice cases accept only those proverbial cases of
the "sponge in the body" as common knowledge cases - in which res ipsa
loquitur is applicable. See supra note 52.
56. See PROSSER, supra note 14, § 39, at 217. Expert testimony "may destroy an
inference which would otherwise arise." Id.; see also Jeffrey W. Puryear,
Schmidt v. Gibbs: The Application of Res Ipsa Loquitur to Arkansas Medical
Malpractice Litigation, 46 ARK. L. REv. 397, 404-05 (1993).
57. E.g., Lecander v. Billmeyer, 492 N.W.2d 167, 170-71 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992).
The court in Lecander noted that expert testimony may be utilized in medical
malpractice actions to demonstrate that a happening could not have occurred
in the absence of negligence. Id. "Medical malpractice actions are treated no
differently than any other actions in which application of res ipsa loquitur is
sought." Id. at 171. However, the court concluded that the expert "testimony
... offered was so specific that it provided a full and complete explanation
of the event." Id.
58. See supra notes 28-43 and accompanying text for a discussion of the impact
of specific evidence on res ipsa loquitur.
59. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
60. Konig, supra note 28, at 414 (emphasis added).
61. Compare Lecander, 492 N.W.2d at 171 (finding that doctrine may not be
invoked where testimony provides complete explanation of event) with Calvin
v. Jewish Hospital of St. Louis, 746 S.W.2d 602, 607 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988)
(holding that expert testimony on several possible theories of recovery does
not present necessary specificity required to bar recourse to res ipsa loquitur).
62. See Calvin, 746 S.W.2d at 607.
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cable. 63 Thus, whether the testimony is allowed to coexist with the
doctrine turns on the earlier question of whether the testimony
demonstrates little or some evidence of negligence or substantial
evidence of negligence. 64 In sum, the focus is not on the expert but,
rather, on the evidence in general.
2. Expert Testimony Outside Medical Malpractice
Few jurisdictions have addressed the issue of whether expert
testimony defeats reliance on res ipsa loquitur in cases other than
medical malpractice. 65 The majority of jurisdictions focus on the
evidence rather than on the fact that an expert is used. 66 Their
reasoning is the same as that used by those jurisdictions that allow
expert testimony in medical malpractice actions in which the plaintiff
relies on res ipsa loquitur. 67 For example, if the testimony furnishes
a complete explanation of the occurrence, the plaintiff will not be
allowed to rely on the doctrine; however, informational testimony or
testimony as to the possibility, rather than as to the certainty, of a
cause can be used to establish an inference of negligence and the
doctrine will not be defeated.
6
An appropriate example of the use of expert testimony in a res
ipsa loquitur case was presented by the plaintiff in Williams v. Otis
Elevator Co. 6 9 In Williams, the plaintiff "fell and gustained injuries
when ... the elevator in which she was riding suddenly lurched as
she was exiting . ".. 70 The plaintiff sued the manufacturer and
alleged that the elevator was negligently maintained and repaired.
71
The plaintiff relied on expert testimony to support her allegation that
63. Lecander, 492 N.W.2d at 171. Other courts have held in a similar(fashion.
See, e.g., infra notes 69-80 and accompanying text for a discussion of Williams
v. Otis Elevator Co., 598 A.2d 302 (Pa. Super. 1991).
64. See supra notes 28-43 for a discussion of the impact of specific evidence on
res ipsa loquitur.
65. See generally SPEISER, supra note 32. Speiser's work provides a comprehensive
analysis of res ipsa loquitur, including an extensive listing of relevant cases.
Although many cases are provided for each proposition (through 1995), there
is little case law covering expert testimony in non-medical malpractice cases.
See id.
66. E.g., Williams v. Otis Elevator Co., 598 A.2d 302 (Pa. Super. 1991).
67. See supra notes 46-64 for a discussion of res ipsa loquitur as it is used in
medical malpractice actions.
68. See supra notes 60-64.
69. 598 A.2d 302 (Pa. Super. 1991).
70. Id. at 303.
71. Id. The plaintiff also brought an action against the owner of the building in
which she was injured. Id. The jury returned a verdict and apportioned
negligence as follows: manufacturer - 55%; building owner - 30%; plaintiff
- 15%. Id. The claim against the owner was settled, leaving only the
manufacturer as defendant on appeal. Id.
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the defendant was negligent in failing to respond to "call backs"
when the elevator was malfunctioning. 2 The expert also opined that
the lurching of the elevator was probably caused by a defect in
component parts." After a trial court verdict for the plaintiff, the
defendant appealed and argued that the evidence presented was
insufficient to warrant the verdict.
74
On appeal, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania discussed the
evidence presented by the plaintiff.7 The court concluded that the
opinion testimony was sufficient to support the verdict 76 and that the
expert opinion testimony did not preclude recourse to res ipsa lo-
quitur. 77 Acknowledging that a "res ipsa loquitur instruction is not
warranted in the face of clear and indubitable proof of negligence
.... " the court noted that "where the facts of a case lie somewhere
in a grey zone ... [the plaintiff] must rely on the res ipsa loquitur
instruction alone."'78 Because the plaintiff's elevator expert was unable
to identify the exact cause of the accident, the court held that the
trial judge acted properly in issuing a res ipsa loquitur instruction.
79
Thus, the court based its holding not on whether an expert was
testifying but, rather, on whether the evidence was of such a specific
nature as to preclude recourse to the doctrine.
80
Although res ipsa loquitur generally may not be invoked when
a plaintiff demonstrates the exact cause of an accident, some juris-
dictions will not allow recourse to the doctrine if the plaintiff's expert
does not point to the cause of the occurrence with a certain degree
of specificity.8" Such was the case in the Supreme Court of Rhode
Island's decision in DaVinci Creations, Inc. v. Nu-Frame.8 2 In Nu-
Frame, the plaintiff's jewelry store was partially destroyed by fire. 3
The fire had allegedly begun on the defendant's premises, which were
72. Id. at 304. The expert testified that the defendant should have been on notice
that the elevator was in ill repair by the number of "call backs" received. Id.
73. Id. Specifically, the expert testified that the brushes, brakes or leveling switches
- parts which the defendant had agreed to maintain - probably caused the
accident. Id.
74. Id. at 303.
75. Id. at 304-05.
76. Id. at 304.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 305-06 (quoting Farley v. Philadelphia Traction Co., 18 A. 1090 (Pa.
1890)).
79. Id. at 306.
80. See id.
81. See, e.g., DaVinci Creations, Inc. v. Nu-Frame, 418 A.2d 851 (R.I. 1980), and
the cases cited therein. For a discussion of the facts, holding and rationale of
DaVinci Creations, see infra notes 82-95.
82. 418 A.2d 851 (R.I. 1980).
83. Id. at 852.
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located directly above the plaintiff's store.8 4 Although the fire did
not reach the floor where the plaintiff stored his merchandise, 85 his
wares were nonetheless damaged by water from the automatic sprin-
kler system.8 6 Plaintiff sued the defendant, alleging property damage,
under the theory that the fire resulted from the defendant's negligence
in maintaining faulty equipment on his premises. 87 Expert testimony
was introduced by the plaintiff that indicated the fire began on
defendant's premises.88 The expert testified that, although he could
not pinpoint the exact components that might have caused the fire,
his testing equipment indicated that the defendant's electrical ma-
chinery was in ill repair and was prone to short-circuit. 89 Based on
his observations, the expert opined that a switch-box caused the fire2 °
In opposition, the defendant presented expert testimony that the
machinery in question was brand new and was, thus, not prone to
malfunction. 91
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island determined that the trial
court did not err either in dismissing the plaintiff's case or in refusing
to submit a res ipsa loquitur instruction to the jury. 92 The court first
noted that in attempting to establish res ipsa loquitur a plaintiff
could present expert testimony to "assist the trial court in pinpointing
the probable accident-causing agency or instrumentality or to offer
a tenable theory of the probable manner in which the accident
occurred." 93 However, the court cautioned that "an expert positing
a theory of causation must speak in terms of strong 'probability."' 
94
Because the expert left the "manner in which the actual kindling
took place ... to conjecture," and because the expert conceded that
other causes were possible, the court held that the plaintiff had failed
to establish that minimum of evidence upon which a plaintiff may
presume a defendant's negligence. 95 Thus, the plaintiff's "dilemma"
84. Id.
85. Id. The fire began on the fourth floor and burned partially through the third
floor ceiling. Id. The plaintiff's merchandise was stored on the second and
third floors. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. Plaintiff alleged that a poorly maintained switch-box in a jack lathe had





92. Id. at 854-55.
93. Id. at 854.
94. Id. The court quoted "probability" in an apparent effort to stress that the
evidence posited by the expert must point, not necessarily conclusively but, at
a minimum, strongly to the cause. See id.
95. Id. The court bolstered its holding with the following reasoning:
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in this case was not "proving too much" to rely on the doctrine, it
was proving "too little" to even meet the minimal evidentiary stan-
dards required to invoke the doctrine.
D. Maryland Law
Maryland requires that the plaintiff prove three elements in order
to invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. 96 A plaintiff must show:
(1) an injury that usually does not occur in the absence of negligence,
which was (2) caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive
control of the defendant, and which occurred (3) under circumstances
indicating that the injury did not result from the act or omission of
the plaintiff.
97
The Maryland court of appeals explained the underlying rationale
behind the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in Blankenship v. Wagner.98
The Blankenship court explained: "The justice of the rule permitting
proof of negligence by circumstantial evidence is found. in the cir-
cumstances that the principal evidence of the true cause of the
accident is accessible to the defendant, but inaccessible to the victim
of the accident." 99 Thus, when a plaintiff offers proof of "specific
grounds of negligence" - presumably inaccessible evidence - Mary-
land courts have held that the plaintiff is precluded from relying on
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.100
An instructional case addressing this evidentiary limitation is
Hickory Transfer Co. v. Nezbed,I"" in which the plaintiffs, who were
injured when a tractor trailer crashed into their home, presented
When a suggested cause of a fire cannot be stated as more probable
than any other, or when an agency or instrumentality causing a fire
cannot be specified with a sufficient degree of certitude, the factfinder
is left to speculate about the existence of negligence. We believe that
such is the case here. We cannot say, therefore, that the expert's
testimony met the strong-probability standard. by which we evaluate
the probative value of an expert opinion introduced to establish an
evidentiary basis for causation in negligence.
Id.
96. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Hicks, 25 Md. App. 503, 516, 337 A.2d
744, 752 (1975); see also Meda, 318 Md. at 423, 569 A.2d at 204; Pahanish,
69 Md. App. at 359-60, 517 A.2d at 1131. Virtually every American jurisdiction
has adopted some form of this three-element test, with variations occurring
only in the language used. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 328D cmt.
a (1965).
97. Hicks, 25 Md. App. at 516, 337 A.2d at 752.
98. 261 Md. 37, 273 A.2d 412 (1971).
99. Id. at 41, 273 A.2d at 414..
100. Peterson v. Underwood, 258 Md. 9, 20, 264 A.2d 851, 857 (1970); Hickory
Transfer Co. v. Nezbed, 202 Md. 253, 262-63, 96 A.2d 241, 245 (1953).
101. 202 Md. 253, 96 A.2d 241 (1953).
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evidence that the accident was caused by the failure of the tractor
trailer's brakes.10 2 The court concluded that the plaintiffs actually
"proved the details of the happening," thereby precluding their
reliance on res ipsa loquitur. 03 In addition, the plaintiffs failed to
prove negligence on the part of the defendants.'0 The court reasoned
that by "explain[ing] away the possible inference of negligence" the
plaintiffs, "[p]aradoxically, proved too little and too much."'0 5
Hickory Transfer limited the range of evidence that a plaintiff
could present if he intended to rely on res ipsa loquitur; this instilled
a reluctance in plaintiffs to produce any direct evidence of negligence,
especially in light of subsequent case law.1°6 For example, in Blan-
kenship v. Wagner'0 7 the plaintiff's attorney, in an effort to avoid
proving "too much," elicited testimony from only the plaintiff and
the defendant. 10 8 The plaintiff's counsel rested after presenting the
events surrounding the accident.'°9 The trial judge refused to submit
res ipsa loquitur instructions to the jury and granted a directed
verdict for the defendant."0 In reversing, the court of appeals ad-
dressed the paradoxical situation created by Hickory Transfer and
102. Id. at 256, 96 A.2d at 242.
103. Id. at 263, 96 A.2d at 245.
104. The plaintiffs sought to explain the reason why the truck struck their house
after the truck collided with another automobile on a nearby highway. Id. at
257-59, 96 A.2d at 242-43. The court found that the plaintiffs' sole theory of
negligence was brake failure. Id. at 261-62, 96 A.2d at 244-45.
105. Id. The court's explanation in Hickory Transfer has become the established
model to which numerous cases addressing evidentiary presentation in res ipsa
loquitur cases have deferred. See, e.g., Blankenship v. Wagner, 261 Md. 37,
46, 273 A.2d 412, 417 (1971) (holding that where plaintiff and defendant
purport to provide all details of accident, res ipsa loquitur does not apply);
Wrenn v. Vincent, 235 Md. 466, 471, 201 A.2d 768, 771 (1964) (finding that
direct inference is sufficient to go to jury and precludes reliance on res ipsa
loquitur).
106. Following Hickory Transfer, the court extended the "too much too little
doctrine" to preclude reliance on res ipsa loquitur when specific evidence was
presented by the plaintiff or the defendant. Coastal Tank Lines, Inc. v. Carroll,
205 Md. 137, 146, 106 A.2d 98, 102 (1954). Further, in Smith v. Bernfeld,
where the plaintiff brought suit for injuries sustained when she fell from a
beauty salon chair, the court found that the attempt to prove specific grounds
of negligence precluded reliance on res ipsa loquitur. 226 Md. 400, 403, 174
A.2d 53, 54 (1961). In Smith, the plaintiffs attempted to establish the defen-
dant's negligence by offering evidence that the defendant's employees, having
knowledge of the defective construction of the chair, failed to bolt it to the
floor. Id.
107. 261 Md. 37, 273 A.2d 412 (1971). The plaintiff was injured when steps collapsed
while he and a co-worker were delivering a refrigerator to the defendant's
house. Id. at 39-40, 273 A.2d at 413-14.
108. Id. at 39, 273 A.2d at 413.
109. See id.
110. Id.
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established a less restrictive rule. The court reasoned that a plaintiff
should not be discouraged from coming forth with circumstantial
evidence that tends to show the defendant's negligence."' Neverthe-
less, the court explained that res ipsa loquitur may not be invoked
when a plaintiff presents more than circumstantial evidence and
demonstrates that "everything relative to the case is known."
1 2
Because the presentation of specific evidence precludes the use
of res ipsa loquitur, an obvious problem arises in cases that involve
expert testimony, which by its nature involves detailed explanation.
Prior to 1990, the Court of Appeals of Maryland had not definitively
answered the question of whether expert testimony precluded reliance
on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. In the 1990 companion cases of
Meda v. Brown"3 and Orkin v. Holy Cross Hospital,"4 the court
held that res ipsa loquitur was not applicable in medical malpractice
cases if expert testimony as to the cause of negligence was pre-
sented." 5 The court explained that while the expert opinions involved
inferential reasoning similar to that used in applying res ipsa loquitur,
the doctrine could not be applied because the jury's inferences must
be drawn from the facts surrounding the occurrence rather than from
inferences posited by experts. 1 6 The court determined that "[c]omplex
111. Id. at 46, 273 A.2d at 417. Circumstantial evidence alone is consistent with
the inference relied upon under res ipsa loquitur because the jury is free to
speculate as to the cause of the plaintiff's injury. See id. However, if either
the plaintiff or defendant purports to prove every relative aspect of the case,
the inference is negated. The jury is left no room to speculate. Id.; see infra
text accompanying note 116.
112. Blankenship, 261 Md. at 46, 273 A.2d at 417. The court relied on Nalee, Inc.
v. Jacobs, 228 Md. 525, 180 A.2d 677 (1962), which qualified the holding in
Smith. See supra note 106. In Nalee, the plaintiff brought suit against the
defendant hotel for injuries sustained when a bench fell over and struck his
right foot. Nalee, 228 Md. at 526, 180 A.2d at 677. The plaintiff's evidence
consisted of testimony that the bench was not secured to the floor. Id. at 528-
29, 180 A.2d at 678-79. The Nalee court held that res ipsa loquitur was
appropriate because the plaintiff went no further than showing the happening
of the event. See id. at 532, 180 A.2d at 680. Addressing its earlier holding in
Smith, the court explained that the plaintiff in Smith was precluded from
relying on res ipsa loquitur because she developed all of the facts with regard
to the actual happening and cause of the accident. Id.
113. 318 Md. 418, 569 A.2d 202 (1990). In Meda, a surgical patient alleged that
she was positioned incorrectly while under anesthesia, resulting in damage to
the ulnar nerve of her arm. Id. at 427, 569 A.2d at 206. Two physicians
testified that the plaintiff's injuries could not have occurred in the absence of
negligence. See id.
114. 318 Md. 429, 569 A.2d 207 (1990). In Orkin, which involved facts nearly
identical to Meda, the plaintiff's expert testified that the injury was most
probably caused by incorrect positioning during surgery. Id. at 431-33, 569
A.2d at 208-09.
115. Id. at 433, 569 A.2d at 206-07; see Meda, 318 Md. at 425, 569 A.2d at 205.
116. Meda, 318 Md. at 427-29, 569 A.2d at 206-07.
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issues of the type generated by a case of [medical malpractice] should
not be resolved by laymen without expert assistance. Res ipsa loquitur
does not apply under these circumstances.""1
7
The Court of Appeals of Maryland's subsequent holding in
Dover Elevator Co. v. Swann is significant because it extended the
holding in Orkin to include all complex cases requiring expert testi-
mony, effectively dropping the medical malpractice qualification."'
III. THE INSTANT CASE
In Dover Elevator, the plaintiff, David Swann, injured his back
when he entered an elevator in an office building on February 2,
1987.119 Upon stopping at Swann's floor, the elevator failed to become
level with the floor. Instead, the elevator came to rest approximately
one foot below the floor.°20 Because Swann was conversing with a
co-worker while entering the elevator and did not notice the mislev-
eling, he stumbled and struck the back of the elevator. 121 Swann
brought suit in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County praying
for three million dollars in damages for injuries sustained from his
fall. 122 The original complaint charged that Prudential, the owner of
the building, and Dover were liable under negligence and product
liability theories. 123
At trial, Swann alleged several theories of liability concerning
the maintenance of the elevator. 24 Swann sought to prove that Dover
negligently repaired the elevator by cleaning rather than replacing
contacts that had "burned together" and that this negligence resulted
117. Orkin, 318 Md. at 433, 569 A.2d at 209.
118. See supra notes 113-17 and accompanying text, discussing Orkin, and infra
notes 137-52 and accompanying text, discussing Dover Elevator.
119. 334 Md. 231, 234, 638 A.2d 762, 764 (1994). The office building, located at
2277 Research Boulevard in Rockville, Maryland, was owned by the Prudential
Insurance Company of America (Prudential). Swann's employer, IBM, leased
the building and was the sole tenant. The building was managed by Carey
Winston Company (Winston). The elevator was manufactured, installed and
maintained by Dover Elevator Company (Dover). Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 235, 638 A.2d at 764.
123. Id. An amended complaint included Winston as a defendant to the action as
well. Count I of Swann's complaint alleged negligent maintenance of the
elevator against all named defendants, and Count II alleged product liability.
Swann v. Prudential Ins. Co., 95 Md. App. 365, 370, 620 A.2d 989, 992
(1993), rev'd, Dover Elevator Co. v. Swann, 334 Md. 231, .638 A.2d 762
(1994). Count II was subsequently dismissed by Swann. Id.
124. Swann alleged that Dover was negligent in failing to service the elevator
correctly, in keeping proper service records and in failing to stock repair parts.
Dover Elevator, 334 Md. at 235, 638 A.2d at 764.
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in the misleveling of the elevator. 125 In support of his allegation,
Swann offered the expert testimony of Donald Moynihan, an elevator
consultant and engineer.126 Moynihan testified that he had conducted
an inspection of the elevator and had reviewed all of Dover's available
maintenance records. 27 He offered his expert opinion that the prob-
able cause of the misleveling of the elevator was the problem with
contacts fourteen and fifteen. 128 Moynihan also testified that Dover's
repairman, Ronald Bothell, acted unreasonably in cleaning the con-
tacts instead of replacing them. 129 In response, the defense offered
the testimony of Bothell, who asserted that the contacts were not
welded together and, therefore, that filing and cleaning the contacts,
rather than replacing them, was an appropriate course of conduct.13 0
The jury returned verdicts in favor of all named defendants. 3' Swann
appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, alleging trial
court errors in excluding and admitting certain evidence and in failing
to give jury instructions on a variety of issues, including res ipsa
loquitur. 132
The court of special appeals held that the trial court erred when
it refused to submit jury instructions on res ipsa loquitur 3 3 The
court found that Swann's attempt to prove specific acts of negligence
did not prevent him from relying on the doctrine. 3 4 The court of
appeals reversed the intermediate appellate court.'35 The court of
125. Specifically, Swann's allegations centered around a series of service calls for
the misleveling of the elevator from December 1986 to February 1987. Id.
Swann sought to prove that the misleveling of the elevator was caused by
contacts 14 and 15, which had "burned closed." Id. at 240, 638 A.2d at 767.
126. Id. at 235, 638 A.2d at 764.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 244, 638 A.2d at 769.
129. Moynihan testified that cleaning the contacts was "[terrible. It shouldn't be
done .... It was wrong." He further testified that replacing the contacts was
the only reasonable course of conduct, explaining that "[i]t is the only way to
do [it] .... [Ylou can't correct them by cleaning them when they are burned
like that. They should be replaced." Id. at 241, 638 A.2d at 767.
130. Id. at 241-42, 638 A.2d at 767.
131. Id. at 235, 638 A.2d at 764.
132. Swann, 95 Md. App. at 371, 620 A.2d at 992.
133. Id. at 397, 620 A.2d at 1005. The court of special appeals found that the
proposed jury instruction referred exclusively to Dover because Swann's pro-
posed jury instruction did not make reference to any other named defendants.
Id. at 389, 620 A.2d at 1001.
134. The court of special appeals reversed the judgment in favor of Dover and
affirmed the judgments entered for Prudential and Winston. Id. at 418, 620
A.2d at 1015.
135. Dover presented two issues to the Court of Appeals of Maryland: (1) whether
the plaintiff, who has offered direct evidence of the specific cause of his
injuries, may rely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in establishing the
defendant's negligence and (2) whether the trial judge erred in refusing to
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appeals found that the evidence presented by Swann was direct
evidence supported by expert testimony that precluded reliance on
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. 136
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, in Swann v. Pru-
dential Insurance Co.,3 7 had held that Swann did not attempt to
provide a complete explanation of the accident in question.' The
mere fact that Swann offered evidence as to the cause of the accident
did not preclude reliance on res ipsa loquitur.'3 9 The intermediate
appellate court found that Blankenship v. Wagner'O and Nalee, Inc.
v. Jacobs14' had made it clear that attempts to prove specific acts of
negligence would not preclude the invocation of res ipsa loquitur.
42
The court concluded that Swann aligned Maryland with the majority
of jurisdictions which hold that 'an unsuccessful attempt to prove
specific negligence on the defendant's part, or the introduction of
evidence of specific negligence not clearly establishing the precise
cause of injury, will not deprive the plaintiff of the benefits .. .of
res ipsa loquitur. '111
43
The Court of Appeals of Maryland, however, found factual
distinctions between Swann's case and both Blankenship and Nalee.'"
The court concluded that both Blankenship and Nalee represented
situations in which the plaintiffs sought to introduce circumstantial
evidence of the negligent acts. 45 In Swann's case, however, the court
instruct the jury on res ipsa loquitur, if res ipsa was an appropriate basis for
finding the defendant's negligence. Dover Elevator, 334 Md. at 234, 638 A.2d
at 763-64.
136. Id. at 256, 638 A.2d at 774.
137. 95 Md. App. 365, 620 A.2d 989 (1993), rev'd, Dover Elevator Co. v. Swann,
334 Md. 231, 628 A.2d 764 (1994).
138. The intermediate appellate court specifically explained that because a dispute
remained at the close of evidence as to the time of the alleged negligent repair
of the elevator and as to what caused the accident, reasonable men could have
differed as to the liability of the defendant. Id. at 396, 620 A.2d at 1004
(citing SPEISER, supra note 32, § 5:19, at 194). The court reasoned: "The
evidence of Dover's negligent repair and maintenance 'may merely support one
of the many possible explanations of the accident, known or unknown."' Id.
139. Id. at 397, 620 A.2d at 1005.
140. 261 Md. 37, 273 A.2d 412 (1971). See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying
text for further discussion of Blankenship v. Wagner.
141. 228 Md. 525, 180 A.2d 677 (1962). See supra note 112 for further discussion
of Nalee, Inc. v. Jacobs.
142. See Swann, 95 Md. App. at 394-95, 620 A.2d at 1003-04.
143. Id. at 395, 620 A.2d at 1003-04 (quoting W.E. Shipley, Annot., Evidence of
Specific Negligence as Affecting Reliance on Res Ipsa Loquitur, 33 A.L.R.2D
791, 793 (1954)).
144. Dover Elevator Co. v. Swann, 334 Md. 231, 245, 638 A.2d 762, 769 (1994).
145. Id. at 245-46, 638 A.2d at 769-70. The court explained that in Blankenship,
the plaintiff merely sought to provide a partial explanation of the cause of the
accident, offering evidence only that he was injured when the steps collapsed.
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found that both the plaintiff and the defendant developed all of the
facts concerning the actual happening of the accident.' 46 The court
held that allowing Swann to rely on res ipsa loquitur undermined
the policy behind the doctrine because the evidence required to explain
the cause of the accident was available to Swann, as reflected by
Moynihan's testimony concerning the defendant's maintenance re-
cords. 1
47
The court of appeals also offered an alternative rationale to that
espoused by the intermediate appellate court. 148 The court of appeals
explained that the expert testimony offered by Moynihan created an
inference of negligence, even if it was not a complete explanation of
the accident. 49 Extending Meda v. Brown, 50 the court held that when
expert testimony is a necessary element of the plaintiff's case, the
plaintiff may not rely on res ipsa loquitur.' 5' Thus, Moynihan's
testimony presented the jury with his set of inferences rather than
permitting the jury to draw its own inferences.
52
Id. at 245, 638 A.2d at 769. Similarly, the court reasoned that in Nalee, the
plaintiff's evidence stopped after showing the happening of the accident,
because the plaintiff presented testimony only that the bench was not fastened
to the floor or the wall. Id. at 247, 638 A.2d at 770.
146. Id. at 247-48, 638 A.2d at 770-71. The court found that by presenting expert
testimony as to the probable cause of the accident and the unreasonable
conduct of the defendant in repairing the elevator, Swann explained the specific
happening of the accident and its cause. Thus, the plaintiff's case was not that
the misleveling incident caused the accident, but that cleaning rather than
replacing the contacts constituted negligence. Id.
147. Id. at 246, 638 A.2d at 769.
148. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
149. Dover Elevator, 334 Md. at 249, 638 A.2d at 771. The court reasoned that
"this was not a case where the jury was presented with some evidence and
then permitted to draw its own inference . . . .At the very least, Moynihan
drew his own inference . . . " Id.
150. 318 Md. 418, 569 A.2d 202 (1990). See supra notes 113-16 and accompanying
text for further discussion of Meda v. Brown.
151. Dover Elevator, 334 Md. at 254, 638 A.2d at 774. The court explained that
Meda clarified the difference between offering direct evidence of negligence
and relying upon res ipsa loquitur. The court stated that a presentation of
expert testimony may cause a case to resemble a res ipsa loquitur case, due to
the inferences drawn by the expert witness and then presented to the jury. But
the court then stated: "[1lt might be said that the 'thing speaks for itself,' at
least in terms of what the facts say to the expert. But that may be said of
inferences in general, and yet it is not res ipsa loquitur as we know that
concept in the law of negligence." Id. at 253, 638 A.2d at 773 (citing Orkin
v. Holy Cross Hosp., 318 Md. 429, 431, 569 A.2d 207, 208 (1990) (companion
case to Meda)).
-152. Id. at 249, 638 A.2d at 770. At one point, the court appears to indicate that
had Moynihan simply explained the damage to the elevator's contacts, rather
than opining as to the probable cause of the accident, res ipsa loquitur would
be appropriate. The court explained that "even if we were to accept the premise
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The Court of Appeals of Maryland, in dicta, also addressed the
issue of res ipsa loquitur jury instructions."' After reviewing case
law on res ipsa loquitur instructions, the court noted that several
jurisdictions have found reversible error where a clearly applicable
instruction was withheld. 5 4 The court also noted that Maryland case
law supports the converse proposition that it is reversible error to
give a res ipsa loquitur instruction when it is inapplicable.' Finally,
the court acknowledged that at least one state leaves the decision as
to whether a res ipsa loquitur jury instruction is appropriate to the
discretion of the trial judge. 5 6 From this review, the court suggested
two guidelines for appropriate jury instructions: (1) that the decision
be left to the discretion of the trial judge; 15 7 and (2) "that a jury
instruction concerning negligence in general may fairly cover the area
of res ipsa loquitur, as long as the judge does not otherwise im-
properly preclude counsel from making such an argument."' 58
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Plaintiff's Dilemma
The effect of the holding in Dover Elevator is to prevent a
plaintiff who brings a typical 5 9 negligence claim from relying on res
that the plaintiff's expert witness did not seek to furnish a complete explanation
of this elevator's misleveling, he drew his own inferences of negligence." Id.
at 252, 638 A.2d at 773. However, the court subsequently stated:
This case involved the complicated inner workings of [an elevator]
which were outside the scope of the average layperson's common
understanding and knowledge, and expert testimony was a necessary
element to the plaintiff's case. Since expert testimony was necessary
to this case, Swann could not rely on res ipsa loquitur ....
Id. at 256, 638 A.2d at 774.
153. Id. at 256-57, 638 A.2d at 775.
154. Id. at 257, 638 A.2d at 775 (citing State Farm v. Municipality of Anchorage,
788 P.2d 726, 730-31 (Alaska 1990); Davis v. Memorial Hosp., 376 P.2d 561
(Cal. 1962); Terrell v. Lincoln Motel, Inc., 443 A.2d 236, 238 (N.J. 1982)).
155. Id. at 257, 638 A.2d at 775 (citing B & K Rentals v. Universal Leaf Tobacco,
324 Md. 147, 162, 596 A.2d 640, 647 (1991); Potomac Edison Co. v. Burdette,
70 Md. App. 566, 575-76, 521 A.2d 1276, 1281, cert. denied, 310 Md. 129,
527 A.2d 50 (1987)).
156. Id. at 258, 638 A.2d at 775 (citing Turtenwald v. Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co., 201 N.W.2d 1, 5-6 (Wis. 1972)).
157. Id. Noting that there was Maryland authority on both sides of the issue, the
court determined that the best option was to leave the decision of whether to
allow a res ipsa loquitur instruction to the trial judge's discretion. Id.
158. Id.
159. "Typical" in this context means a case premised not on mere circumstantial
evidence but, rather, a case in which the plaintiff has access to specific and
direct evidence of the injury-causing occurrence.
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ipsa loquitur as a fall-back position. 6 A plaintiff must either choose
to go forward with a general claim of negligence or invoke the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and rely on a presumptive inference of
negligence from circumstantial evidence.' 61 This holding presents dif-
ficulties for the plaintiff, because the plaintiff must scrutinize his
evidence before trial to determine whether he may rely on the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur. If a plaintiff fails to consider available evidence
and relies, instead, upon the availability of a res ipsa loquitur claim,
he leaves himself open to the dilemma of proving "too little and too
much." 162
As the Court of Appeals of Maryland explained in Hickory
Transfer Co. v. Nezbed, 163 relying on res ipsa loquitur and presenting
specific evidence of negligence may lead to a situation where the
plaintiff proves too much to rely on an inference of circumstantial
negligence and proves too little to prevail on a general claim of
negligence. 164This holding led to "plaintiff paranoia" when it came
time to present evidence. 65 As a result, the court of appeals, sym-
pathizing with the plaintiff, established a less restrictive rule. 166 The
line of cases decided shortly after Hickory Transfer67 - in which
the plaintiffs, who relied on res ipsa loquitur and who were fearful
of proving too much, simply pointed to the circumstances of the
accident and rested - exhibited the court's willingness to allow
recourse to the doctrine in such situations.'6 The court based these
less restrictive holdings on the fact that res ipsa loquitur was premised
on a lack of evidence. At the same time, the court reemphasized
that, had the plaintiffs sought to introduce specific evidence, reliance
would have been precluded. 169 Thus, the court was sympathetic to
the plaintiff who provided very little evidence and was unyielding to
the plaintiff who provided too much. The court based its position
160. See Dover Elevator, 334 Md. at 253, 638 A.2d at 773 (finding res ipsa loquitur
warranted only "when 'the demands of justice make its application essential')
(quoting Blankenship v. Wagner, 261 Md. 37, 41, 273 A.2d 412, 414 (1971)).
161. See supra notes 101-12, 145-46, 151-52 and accompanying text.
162. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
163. 202 Md. 253, 96 A.2d 241 (1953).
164. Id. at 261-62, 96 A.2d at 244-45. See supra notes 100-05 and accompanying
text for further discussion of Hickory Transfer Co. v. Nezbed.
165. See Blankenship v. Wagner, 261 Md. 37, 273 A.2d 412 (1971) (plaintiffs
presented very little evidence, hoping to avoid proving "too much").
166. See supra notes 111-12, 149-52 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
rationale behind the court's less restrictive rule.
167. See, e.g., Blankenship, 261 Md. at 39, 273 A.2d at 413; Nalee, Inc. v. Jacobs,
228 Md. 525, 528-29, 180 A.2d 677, 678-79 (1962).
168. See supra notes 106-12 and accompanying text for a discussion of the court's
willingness to allow recourse to the doctrine when very little evidence of
negligence was presented.
169. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
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on the fact that res ipsa loquitur was originally intended to aid the
plaintiff who had little or no evidence of the occurrences leading to
his injury. 170 This rationale, which had its genesis forty-four years
ago, in Hickory Transfer, 17 was reaffirmed in Dover Elevator. 72 The
court's holding in Dover Elevator, that res ipsa loquitur may not be
relied upon in complex cases, has virtually shut the door on the
doctrine in the state of Maryland. Although the court of appeals
should be recognized for this display of unerring consistency, it
should not be heralded for its lack of insight and its archaic dispo-
sition.
Times change and with them the law. Legal theories of tort law
recovery, such as products liability,' 73 have evolved to address the
technological advances and social evolution that have resulted since
the inception of our legal system. In addition, the elements of tort
recovery have been modified by courts to address the growing com-
plexity of the twentieth century. For example, proximate cause has
undergone a series of modifications as complex machinery and serv-
ices make it more difficult to determine the cause of injury and the
extent of duty.174 Maryland, unlike many other jurisdictions, has
failed to recognize that res ipsa loquitur, like any other theory of
recovery, must be allowed to change as society changes.
Chancellor Pollock first coined the Latin phrase res ipsa loquitur
in 1863. Since that time, a plethora of technological advances have
taken place.' 75 As a result, res ipsa loquitur has been applied in
170. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 101-05 and accompanying text for further discussion of Hickory
Transfer.
172. See supra notes 98-100, 144-47 and accompanying text.
173. A recent decision of the Court of Appeals of Maryland provides an excellent
example of modifying a theory of recovery to fit a present-day situation. In
the oft-cited case of Kelley v. R.G. Industries, Inc., 304 Md. 124, 467 A.2d
1143 (1985), the court of appeals held that manufacturers of a type of gun
designated as "Saturday Night Special" could be strictly liable for injury
resulting from the gun's discharge during the commission of a crime. Id. at
157-59, 467 A.2d at 1159-60. The court's holding has been described as an
atypical extension of products liability. DAVID A. FISCHER & WILLIAM POWERS,
JR., PRODUCTS LIABILITY, CASES AND MATERIALS 200 (2d ed. 1994). This holding
presented such an extension, in fact, that the Maryland legislature passed a
statute negating the holding. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 36-(h) (1992 &
Supp. 1995).
174. See, e.g., Palsgraff v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo's
and Andrew's debate concerning technological innovations such as explosives
and locomotive transportation playing a role in extension of proximate cause).
175. For example, air travel, elevators and the mass consumption of electricity and
gas are modern technological innovations that have been developed since the
conception of res ipsa loquitur, and each represents a situation to which res
ipsa loquitur is typically applicable. See infra notes 176-77 and accompanying
text.
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situations where injury has occurred through the use, or misuse, of
complex machinery.' 76 For example, the Second Restatement of Torts
cites falling elevators, train derailments, airplane crashes, the escape
of gas or electricity from wires or appliances and the explosion of
water boilers as occurrences for which res ipsa loquitur may be
applicable. 7  These occurrences were certainly not contemplated when
res ipsa loquitur was created. However, many jurisdictions have
consistently allowed application of the doctrine in such situations .
7
The Court of Appeals of Maryland, however, rather than modifying
the doctrine to allow it to be justly applied in these typical scenarios,
has, instead, sounded the death knell for res ipsa loquitur in the
state of Maryland.
One could argue that the court of appeals has not precluded the
use of the doctrine altogether but, rather, has restricted its application
to those cases where specific evidence of negligence is not required.
In other words, it could be argued that the court has merely held
that the doctrine may not be invoked when specific evidence of
negligence has been presented. This view is misguided for two reasons.
First, the court of appeals, in Dover Elevator, concluded that res
ipsa loquitur may not be applied in complex cases. 179 The above
examples obviously involve complexity, either in operation or ge-
ometry, to some degree. Thus, under a literal reading of the court's
holding, res ipsa loquitur could never be invoked to explain an
elevator falling or an airplane crashing. Second, the court concluded
that res ipsa loquitur may not be invoked in cases requiring expert
testimony. 80 Under most circumstances, expert testimony is required
in order for a jury of laymen to understand the nature of the above
occurrences. Thus, the court's rationale is likely nothing more than
a smoke screen intended to obscure its blanket preclusion of res ipsa
loquitur, except, of course, in those archaic circumstances where a
barrel falls from a window, provided that there was no complex
machinery involved in the fall.
Ironically, the court of appeals' holding has solved the "paranoid
plaintiff's" dilemma of proving "too little and too much." In
176. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 328D cmt. c (1965).
177. Id.
178. E.g., Cox v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 379 F.2d 893 (7th Cir.) (applying res
ipsa loquitur in case involving complete disappearance of airplane), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 1044 (1967); United States v. Kesinger, 190 F.2d 529 (10th Cir. 1951)
(applying res ipsa loquitur in case involving unexplained airplane crash); Nelson
v. Zamboni, 204 N.W. 943 (Minn. 1925) (applying res ipsa loquitur in case
involving gas explosion); Williams v. Otis Elevator Co., 598 A.2d 302 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1991) (holding res ipsa loquitur instruction proper against company
maintaining elevator).
179. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 117, 147, 151-52 and accompanying text.
19961
Baltimore Law Review
complex cases, a plaintiff cannot rest after simply pointing to the
circumstance of an occurrence because a jury of laymen would not
be able to understand the injury-causing instrument. 8' Conversely, a
plaintiff who provides expert testimony or who presents specific
evidence concerning the complexity of the accident causing device
will, of course, be precluded from relying on the doctrine alto-
gether. 8 2 Based on the literal holding of Dover Elevator, res ipsa
loquitur, for all intents and purposes, is no longer a desirable option
in the state of Maryland.' 83
B. Promoting Complication and Expense
Potential defendants, especially those in the medical malpractice
arena, must have collectively cheered when the Court of Appeals of
Maryland handed down its decision in Dover Elevator. Maryland
defendants will no longer live in fear of those three Latin words and
can instead take comfort in the fact that litigation will be decided,
not by circumstances and presumptions, but by battling experts and
corporate money.
By and large, defendants in cases vulnerable to res ipsa loquitur
are product manufacturers and insurance companies. 1' Defendants
in these cases often have more money to spend on defense than the
plaintiff has to support his own litigation efforts. Because a claim
based on res ipsa loquitur requires little evidentiary presentation -
hence, less money - such a claim has the effect of keeping litigation
costs down for the plaintiff. For this reason, less affluent plaintiffs
often have been able to challenge successfully wealthy corporations
and insurance companies.8 5 Restricting the application of res ipsa
181. A complex case, by definition, would be beyond the grasp of a layman; thus,
resting after simply pointing to the occurrence would result in confusion rather
than an inference of negligence.
182. Presenting expert testimony in a complex case precludes recourse to the doctrine.
See supra notes 117, 147, 151-52 and accompanying text.
183. The result of the court's holding in Dover Elevator, becomes, in a sense, a
"catch-22." A plaintiff must not present expert testimony in a complex case
if he wishes to rely on res ipsa loquitur; yet, complex cases require expert
testimony. In the end, the only solution is to forgo reliance on the doctrine
altogether.
184. See, e.g., Barrett v. Danbury Hosp., 232 A.2d 748 (Conn. 1995) (defendant
was a hospital); Nalee, Inc. v. Jacobs, 228 Md. 525, 180 A.2d 677 (1962)
(defendant was an owner of hotel chains); Swann v. Prudential Ins. Co., 95
Md. App. 365, 620 A.2d 989 (1993) (defendants were an elevator manufacturer
and an insurance company); Gayheart v. Dayton Power & Light Co., 648
N.E.2d 72 (Ohio App. 1994) (defendant was a power company); Williams v.
Otis Elevator Co., 598 A.2d 302 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (defendant was an
elevator manufacturer); Turtenwald v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 201
N.W.2d 1 (Wis. 1972) (defendant was an insurance company).
185. See supra cases noted in notes 4, 36, 69, 82, 101.
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loquitur may prevent many plaintiffs from initiating litigation, be-
cause many plaintiffs lack the funds to pay the rising costs associated
with expert testimony and detailed evidentiary gathering and produc-
tion. Even cases taken on a contingent fee basis may be affected.
Attorneys accepting such fee arrangements often weigh the potential
award against likely litigation costs. If the assessment does not
indicate that a certain margin of profit will be attained, the attorney
will likely decline the case. Thus, if the expert fees and discovery
costs are too high, a plaintiff may have no avenue to pursue com-
pensation. Denying plaintiffs recourse to res ipsa loquitur in expen-
sive, complex cases may deny wrongly injured individuals access to
the justice system.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland has assured defendants that
as long as they can make their cases complicated they will not be
vulnerable to res ipsa loquitur. 1 6 Defendants engaged in cases that
may be applicable for res ipsa loquitur will, and should, attempt to
make the injury-causing occurrence as confusing as possible. Based
upon the holding in Dover Elevator, the defendant need only make
the details of the happening sufficiently complex to require expert
testimony. This could lead to some interesting defense arguments,
especially in medical malpractice actions.8 7
Considering the court's holdings in Orkin v. Holy Cross Hos-
pital,18 8 Meda v. Brown s9 and Dover Elevator, it is apparent that res
ipsa loquitur will be applicable only in those cases involving obvious
acts or omissions of negligence. This leaves res ipsa loquitur available,
arguably, only in simple cases, such as those involving the proverbial
"sponge left in the body" scenario. 19 If the court's holding is taken
literally, however, the doctrine may be precluded even in these
extreme cases. For example, it is possible to make even the act of
leaving a medical instrument in the body cavity complicated. This
can be illustrated using the "sponge left in the body" example. It
could be argued that a sponge may become discolored by blood,
thereby making it difficult to detect or that a sponge was relocated
by body fluids or other bodily functions. Perhaps the sponge was
manufactured by a company that claimed it could be absorbed by
the body over time. In each of these scenarios, a defendant could
186. See supra notes 117, 150-52 and accompanying text.
187. See discussion of "sponge in the body" scenario, infra text accompanying note
190.
188. 318 Md. 429, 569 A.2d 207 (1990); see supra notes 112-16 and accompanying
text.
189. 318 Md. 418, 569 A.2d 202 (1990). See supra notes 113-17 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the companion cases of Meda v. Brown and Orkin v.
Holy Cross Hospital.
190. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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argue that expert testimony would be required due to the complexity
of surgery and the difficulty in understanding the functioning of the
human body. In addition, depending upon who is sued or impleaded,
the composition and manufacturing process of the sponge could be
at issue. Thus, a sly defendant could make even a simple case appear
complex in application, thereby bringing it within the preclusive
holding of Dover Elevator.
C. The Ends Do Not Justify the Means
The court's holding is a harbinger of impending tort reform.
Perhaps the court is convinced that personal injury lawyers have
enough ammunition as is and need not be provided with one more
bullet. In light of the court's holding, and, specifically, its reference
to the dissent by Chief Judge Wilner of the court of special appeals, 19'
the court of appeals is indicating an intention to move away from
the use of res ipsa loquitur. Although protecting defendants from
our litigious society may be an admirable goal, doing so at the
expense of the wrongly injured plaintiff may not be a just cure.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland appears to be initiating its
own brand of tort reform. Public outcry over the media's ridiculously
exaggerated stories concerning damage awards and a perceived rise
in litigation have led some courts to side with defendants on issues
subject to public and media scrutiny. 92 Res ipsa loquitur represents
one such issue. One need look no further than the court of appeals's
recent decisions sustaining damage caps to note this judicial para-
digm. 93 Although the current tort system is not perfect, limiting
191. "To allow an inference that the malfunction is due to someone's negligence
when the precise cause cannot be satisfactorily established appears to me to be
unwarranted." Dover Elevator, 334 Md. at 256 n.4, 638 A.2d at 774 n.4 (citing
Swann, 95 Md. App. at 419, 620 A.2d at 1015-16 (Wilner, C.J., dissenting)).
192. See Glenn W. Bailey, Litigation is Destroying American Companies, USA
TODAY .(MAGAZINE), Jan. 1994, at 76 (painting particularly bad picture of
American lawyer and legal system and citing legal expenses and damage awards).
193. See Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24, 660 A.2d 423 (1995) (upholding cap on
noneconomic damages against constitutional challenge and holding that cap
covers loss of consortium damages); Ellerin v. Fairfax Savings, 337 Md. 216,
652 A.2d 1117 (1995) (vacating jury award of punitive damages and holding
trial court's jury instruction on damages too broad).
It is also troubling to note that the court has opined that legislative policy
may be considered when determining the proportionality of an award for
punitive damages. Ellerin, 337 Md. at 242 n.13, 652 A.2d at 1129 n.13.
Considering legislative policy could be akin to considering tort reform as more
legislatures are swayed by public and media pressure to cap damages. Judge
Bell, concurring and dissenting in Ellerin, described this policy as troubling.
Id. at 246, 652 A.2d at 1132 (Bell, J., concurring and dissenting). Judge Bell
noted that "lr]eferring in punitive damage instructions to these maximum
monetary penalties, but telling the jury it is not a cap, would only confuse the
jury and, very likely, would tend to usurp the jury function." Id. at 246-47,
652 A.2d at 1132 (Bell, J., concurring and dissenting).
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plaintiff recovery for the sake of lessening litigation and ameliorating
a perceived, media-inspired social outcry is missing the point. Limi-
ting recovery on a case-by-case basis would place less of a burden
on the plaintiff and would, at least, allow a res ipsa loquitur claim
to be brought. Precluding reliance on the doctrine altogether removes
a valuable weapon from the plaintiff's arsenal and unfairly benefits
large corporate entities and insurance companies. The courtroom
should be the arena, not the airwaves.
D. Recommendation: Allowing Instructional Testimony
Instead of precluding reliance on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
in all complex cases requiring expert testimony, the court of appeals
should have taken the "middle road" that several other jurisdictions
have adopted.194 Some jurisdictions allow expert testimony to coexist
with the doctrine, as long as the expert does not offer an opinion
as to the exact cause of the accident. 195 This type of instructional
testimony allows the plaintiff the opportunity to apply the doctrine
in complex cases without destroying the inferences and presumptions
upon which res ipsa loquitur is based. The testimony serves to inform
the laymen of the jury as to the operation, maintenance and effects
of the injury-causing device. The jury is then free to draw its own
conclusions based on the circumstances of the occurrence. Thus, the
focus is still on the evidence, but the blanket preclusion in complex
cases is lifted. I9
Such a holding would better serve the Maryland litigant, because
it would allow a plaintiff recourse to the doctrine in complex cases
without prejudicing the defendant. The testimony does not specify
the cause of the accident, nor does it point a figurative finger of
blame at the defendant. The defendant is free to rebut evidence as
to the operation of the injury-causing device. In addition, this process
is more cost-effective for the plaintiff than precluding reliance on
the doctrine altogether. Rather than having to pay for the opinions
194. See supra notes 69-80 and accompanying text for a discussion of Williams v.
Otis Elevator Co., 598 A.2d 302 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991), in which expert
testimony is allowed to co-exist with the doctrine. See also DaVinci Creations,
Inc. v. Nu-Frame Co., 418 A.2d 851, 853 (R.I. 1980) (introducing expert
testimony to pinpoint probable accident-causing agency or instrumentality or
to offer tenable theory).
195. See supra notes 69-80.
196. This may be what the court of appeals had in mind to begin with because its
reasoning is focused on evidentiary presentation. See Dover Elevator Co. v.
Swann, 334 Md. 231, 245-56, 638 A.2d 762, 769-74 (1994). However, the
court's literal holding precludes reliance on the doctrine in any complex case
requiring expert testimony. Id. at 256, 638 A.2d at 774. The court's holding
is, in effect, much broader than the rationale upon which it is based.
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of a battery of qualified experts, the plaintiff need only present
testimony sufficient to explain the underlying complexity associated
with his injury. Because the focus is on clarification rather than on
the quality of opinion, the need to find an expert with a "more
respected opinion" than the opponent's expert is lessened.
This solution would best modify the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
in order to make it compatible with the present technological and
social environment, without destroying the doctrine's foundation. In
other words, allowing instructional testimony to coexist with the
doctrine keeps the focus of inquiry on circumstantial evidence and
inferential reasoning, while allowing the plaintiff the opportunity to
apply the doctrine to a complex, twentieth-century situation. Pre-
cluding recourse to the doctrine in all cases requiring expert testimony
does a great injustice to Maryland plaintiffs and ignores the dynamics
upon which the legal system should, and must, be based if it is to
evolve to fit the needs and circumstances of today's complex, multi-
faceted society.
V. CONCLUSION
Dover Elevator Co. v. Swann addresses the issue of whether a
plaintiff may present specific evidence as to the cause of an accident
or occurrence and still rely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. 97
The resulting opinion clarified Maryland's law on the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur and significantly restricted its use. 19 The court of
appeals, holding that a plaintiff's attempt to offer specific evidence
concerning the cause of an accident precluded the application of res
ipsa loquitur, reaffirmed Maryland's divergence from the majority
of jurisdictions.199 The court went further to preclude the use of res
ipsa loquitur in complicated cases requiring expert testimony. In
doing so, the court has burdened Maryland plaintiffs and has ignored
the evolutionary nature of tort law recovery. The court of appeals
has taken a large step towards returning the doctrine to the use for
which it was originally intended - cases in which flour barrels fall




197. See supra notes 119-58 and accompanying text for a discussion of Dover
Elevator.
198. See supra notes 136-52 and accompanying text.
199. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text; Blankenship v. Wagner, 261 Md.
37, 42, 273 A.2d 412, 415 (1971) ("Classic patterns [are those] in which
someone is struck by a falling object.").
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